Interview : Russell Sobel by Doug Campbell
INTERVIEW
RF: How did you come to edit the recently published
book, Unleashing Capitalism: Why Prosperity Stops at the
West Virginia Border and How to Fix It?
Sobel: If you have a friend who is a medical doctor, when they
go to parties they are always asked, “Hey doc, I have this rash.
Can you look at it?” Being an economist in West Virginia is a
lot like that, because our economy is just so horrible, not only
in the level of per-capita income but also in growth statistics.
This economy is just not doing very well, and it’s on a lot of
people’s minds here in West Virginia. So I get asked all the
time: “What can we do about it? You’re an economist. What
can we do to fix the West Virginia economy?” The problem is
that it’s not a one-sentence answer. I’ve been wanting for the
longest time to put together some scholars to take a hard look
at the policy questions in West Virginia to see how we could
change our policies in order to help increase economic
growth. We ended up getting 25 scholars from across the
nation together, including an editor of a leading economic
journal and some legal scholars. They analyzed different West
Virginia public policies, like the tax code and the legal system,
and we put their papers together in a book. 
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Russell Sobel
Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s 
conversation with Russell Sobel. For the full interview, 
go to our Web site: www.richmondfed.org
West Virginia has long been one of the poorest states,
despite decades of government programs aimed at
stimulating growth. In a new book, 25 scholars take 
the question of West Virginia’s struggling economy
head-on and offer a number of solutions — none 
of which have to do with state-run economic develop-
ment programs. The book was edited by West Virginia
University (WVU) economist Russell Sobel, who also
contributed several articles.
Anative of South Carolina, Sobel brought a unique
free-market orientation to the book. His research 
has focused on ways to foster entrepreneurship,
restrain government spending, and use tax codes to 
promote economic growth. He has also investigated
government failures in disaster relief efforts, most
recently with the response to Hurricane Katrina.
Sobel’s varied fields of inquiry have encompassed the
implications of increased safety features in NASCAR
and the preferability of the Articles of Confederation
to the Constitution. His research has been published
in the Journal of Political Economy, Economic Inquiry,
and the Journal of Economic Perspectives, among 
other journals. He is also the co-author of a leading 
economics textbook, Economics: Private and 
Public Choice.
Sobel joined WVU’s economics department straight
out of graduate school in 1994. He served as founding
director of the school’s Entrepreneurship Center and
now holds the James Clark Coffman Distinguished
Chair in Entrepreneurial Studies. His classroom 
innovations, including the use of walkie-talkies in 
large lecture classes, have won him several teaching
awards. Doug Campbell interviewed Sobel on the
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largely to blame for the state’s poor economic perform-
ance. A lot of people believe that natural resources and
geography are the major determinants of economic
growth. Why, in your opinion, is that notion mistaken?
Sobel: The best way to think about an economy is that every-
one starts with some ingredients, some inputs to work with.
Then you’ve got to bake those ingredients — that’s what the
institutions are, the way your economy is organized. Do you
organize your economy based on markets or based on central
planning? Comparing North Korea to South Korea is useful.
They have the same inputs to work with, the same land, same
climate, same population, and same history. But they have
wildly different economic outcomes, and it’s not due to 
differences in inputs. It’s due to dif-
ferences in the way they structure
their economies. It’s not to say the
inputs aren’t important, but what
you can make from your inputs
depends on the efficiency of the
economy in which inputs are uti-
lized. To make the most productive
use of those inputs is key.
In West Virginia we’ve been
dumping dollar after dollar at the
state level into increasing educa-
tion funding, building interstates,
and all of these other inputs. But
the problem is that we can’t get the
oven turned on so we keep throw-
ing these inputs in there. We’ve got all these people now
going to college who weren’t before, but they’re leaving the
state after graduation and going to North Carolina and
Virginia and other places. The problem is that investments
in education are never going to pay off until the jobs are here
for those people to take.
I’m not saying policies are responsible for everything
that’s wrong in West Virginia, but look and compare us to
other similar states, and then growth rates speak volumes for
how much of the difference is due to different policies.
Charleston, W.Va., and Charlotte, N.C., 50 years ago had
identical populations and identical per-capita incomes. Now
Charlotte is 10 times the size of Charleston. Charleston is
shrinking. North Carolina is a good comparative state
because it lost much of its textile industry to foreign compe-
tition. It is very rural except for the Research Triangle and
Charlotte areas. It’s a similar kind of state that has experi-
enced a lot of devastating things. But all economies
experience devastating things. All economies go through
creative destruction, where firms die and industries die. The
key is to have an economy that’s vibrant enough to replace
those with new industries and new businesses. North
Carolina has been very successful with that, especially
Charlotte. Those banking headquarters didn’t locate there
because of something underneath the ground. They could
have located anywhere. They could have just as easily gone
to Charleston, W.Va., but they have a good business climate
in North Carolina that attracts businesses.
RF: Which specific policies in West Virginia do you
believe are most in need of reform?
Sobel:  You need to look at our policies in West Virginia 
relative to other states. Our book goes into a lot of different
areas, but if you look at taxes and the legal system, I think
those are the two biggest barriers to growth in West Virginia.
We levy very high taxes on capital investment in West
Virginia, for example. One of the things I do with the book is
show photos of the state border. MeadWestvaco, originally
called the West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., a Fortune 500
company, has a plant on the other
side of the border in Maryland.
That’s billions of dollars in capital
right there on the other side of our
border, and when you’re investing
that much money, small differ-
ences in the tax code matter. 
We have two taxes that hit
capital investment very heavily
here in West Virginia. There is a
business franchise tax based on
gross receipts, not profits; and we
have a very high property tax on
machinery, inventory, and equip-
ment. It’s so high, in fact, that
when Toyota negotiated its plant
in Buffalo, W.Va., the whole negotiation centered on having
the state own all their equipment and lease it back to them.
That makes them exempt from state property taxes because
it’s state-owned property. Alot of the local economic develop-
ment agencies do the same thing. They own all the machinery
and lease it back to firms so they can avoid the high taxes.
Well, that’s great if you’re Toyota and can negotiate that. But
if you’re a small entrepreneur without a lot of political pull,
what then? We’ve got a very heavy tax on capital investment,
which is really a shame because capital investment is so criti-
cal for increasing labor productivity and getting people tools
and machinery to work with, not to mention jobs.
Piece two of the puzzle is legal reform. We have lawsuit
abuse. When you look at the legal climate rankings, 
West Virginia is at the bottom of those as well. One problem
is venue shopping. We allow plaintiffs to pick which court 
they want to try their case in, so you can shop around for
sympathetic judges. All the asbestos cases came here to 
West Virginia. We also have a problem with joint and 
several liability, which is when several people are negligent in
different proportions for damage. Here in West Virginia, 
we sue both of them for 100 percent. Everybody tries to tag
on Wal-Mart or a big firm to every lawsuit, someone with
deep pockets. The firms here in West Virginia are sued 
a lot and they have very high legal costs. 
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U.S. states appoint judges, and the others use elections, but
only a handful of those do it on a partisan basis. When you
run for a judgeship in West Virginia, you run as either a
Republican or a Democrat on a political platform. Our last
Supreme Court race was a good example: You had a
Democrat saying, “If you elect me, I will decide cases in favor
of labor,” and a Republican saying, “I will decide cases in favor
of businesses.” In most states that elect judges, you run on
your name and record. We have a very politicized legal 
system in West Virginia. So overall I’d say 80 percent of the
problem is the tax code and our legal system. We also have
some regulatory problems and we look at those in the 
book as well.
RF: You have written a number of papers on the 
economics of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). Your analysis suggests that the failure
of FEMA to respond effectively to Hurricane Katrina
was wholly unsurprising. Why?
Sobel: Before Katrina, I wrote a paper with a then-graduate
student, Tom Garrett, now at the St. Louis Fed. We were
looking at the process for disaster declarations and the 
funding that’s allocated for disasters when they occur. What
we found is that, with the disaster declaration program,
which is controlled by the president, all of the last five pres-
idents had the largest numbers of disasters declared in their 
presidencies during their re-election years, their fourth
years. They were also much more likely to declare them in
battleground states. Last time, West Virginia was a battle-
ground state, and I was joking that it was going to be a bad
year for the weather.
Now, Hurricane Katrina was a no-brainer in terms of
declaring it a disaster. But those kinds of storms are just a
handful of the hundreds of disasters that are declared every
year. The majority is for severe rain and windstorms, and
they’re a judgment call. So politics plays a huge role in terms
of whether a disaster is declared or not. The second part is,
given a disaster declaration, is there politics at play in terms
of how much funding an area gets? We found that is the case.
The funding is most influenced by congressional oversight.
So if you have a representative on the FEMAoversight com-
mittee, then your area is likely to get more funding than if
not. (This was before FEMA was moved under the
Department of Homeland Security.)
We ended up doing four or five specific papers on what
went wrong with Katrina and how we can reform FEMA to
better handle natural disaster relief in the United States. 
Our research points to several things. One is the bureaucracy.
In any government organization, the result can be some-
thing that Michael Heller called “the tragedy of 
the anti-commons,” which is when too many people have
veto rights, so it becomes hard to get permission to do 
anything and it slows down the process. That was the case
with Katrina. Also, much like the FDA, which economists
have criticized for being too cautious with approvals for 
new drugs, that same incentive seems to be at work with
FEMA in that they were very cautious about allowing 
people into disaster zones, because if something happens 
to one person, then they are under pressure for letting 
that happen.
RF: What is the biggest problem you identified?
Sobel: It is that essentially what FEMAdoes in these disaster
areas is it goes in and basically imposes central planning on the
economic activity within the disaster area. For instance,
Greyhound Bus Lines was willing to evacuate people from the
Superdome for free. They kept calling and couldn’t get an
answer. If you want to go in and help in the disaster area, or if
you’re a demander in the disaster area who wants something,
you have to go through FEMA. All these demands and 
supplies have to be communicated to the central agency and
matched up. The day before Katrina hit, the Coca-Cola
Company could deliver as much Dasani bottled water into
New Orleans as it wanted without any special approval. But
then all of a sudden bottled water is needed more than ever
and Coca-Cola can’t get into New Orleans because they 
can’t get approval from FEMA to deliver the truckloads of
bottled water they have. We need to separate out this aspect
of economic activity, which is really that after a disaster, the
fundamental problem at hand is a problem of getting
resources into an economy and figuring out which resources
are needed and finding suppliers and matching them up.
That’s what a market economy does really well, and we 
are basically shutting out that process in these natural 
disaster areas.
What we suggest would be much better is this: 
In a market economy, there is a fundamental role 
for government to protect individuals and their property 
to eliminate coercion and violence, to enforce the legal 
system, and to provide basic public goods such as 
infrastructure, roads, and those kinds of things. 
The government role after a natural disaster should be 
very similar to its role in the everyday economy. 
Its most important role is to go in and secure law and 
order and start repairing roads and bridges and infrastruc-
ture, providing the fundamental things that an economy
needs to work with. But then it should let Coca-Cola 
and others in the private sector worry about the bottled
water. There is no reason why they needed special 
permission. If the government wants to help with bringing
in free bottled water, that’s fine, let them support the
process to help provide people in need with the things 
they need, but don’t shut out private enterprise. We had a 
lot of men and women after Katrina ready to go in and 
give relief, and we need to use those talents to a 
much greater extent. The people in government aren’t 
evil; they don’t have bad intentions. They really want 
to do things right, but they don’t have a fundamental
knowledge of economics.
30 Region Focus • Summer 2007
REGION FOCUS REWORK SUMMER ISSUE  9/20/07  4:18 PM  Page 30RF: Your research suggests that states fall into fiscal
crises primarily because of cyclical downturns. Why
don’t policymakers ensure that rainy day funds aren’t
short during the inevitable times of need?
Sobel: I started my research on state fiscal crises while in
graduate school. I became interested after the recession in
early 1991, with fiscal crises everywhere. Along with my co-
authors, I started looking at rainy day funds and wondered
why most states ran their funds to zero very quickly during
a recession. They simply didn’t have
the surplus built up in their rainy
day funds to help them weather
their recessions. Why do they have
these things if they’re not funding
them, and how big of a role do they
play in trying to ease the fiscal stress
that’s associated with recessions?
What we found is that there is a big
difference across states in their
rules over these funds. Some states
have rules and requirements on
when money can be deposited and
withdrawn from the account. With
others it’s just an account that the
legislature can deposit or withdraw
money from anytime it wants.
Other states have it set up it so that
withdrawals and deposits are based
on how far your actual revenues are
off from your forecasted revenues.
That’s what we have in West
Virginia, so here you can only access
the rainy day fund when revenues
come in short of what was forecast-
ed.Well, you could be in the middle
of an economic boom and have rev-
enues fall short of forecast and
withdraw money out of the fund.
On the other hand, you could be in
a recession but you just happen to
have accurately forecast revenues so
you can’t access the rainy day fund.
We asked whether these rules
matter in terms of how much states
are able to build up their funds and whether they’re able to
weather recessions without cutting spending and raising
taxes. Sure enough, those states with requirements on
deposits and withdrawing money were much more effective
at building up the surpluses they needed to help them
weather recessions. If you’re going to have an unstructured
rainy day fund, you might as well not have one.
RF: You argue that, in some ways, the Articles of
Confederation were preferable to the Constitution.
Could you briefly explain?
Sobel:  One of the things I was very interested in 
was comparing the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution because of my dissertation research on 
the United Nations (U.N.). Almost every year a proposal
comes up in the U.N. General Assembly to give the organi-
zation the power of international taxation. Most people
argue, “No, we don’t want to do that,” because most prefer
having their funding of the U.N. come from contributions
from member states. The members give money or can 
withdraw themselves if they don’t like what’s going 
on. Ironically, that’s exactly the 
system of financing our federal gov-
ernment had under the Articles of
Confederation. The federal govern-
ment did not have the power of
taxation. It had a budget allocated
across the states, and the states then
raised the money and sent it to the
federal government. When we
moved to the Constitution, we gave
the federal government the power 
of taxation. Some of my research 
has looked into this contribution
mechanism of financing govern-
ment. I think it has a lot of potential
to really promote economic efficien-
cy and good government.
It transfers a lot of power back to
the states and decreases centraliza-
tion. You get a lot more control over
your federal government. Like with
the U.N., member states can say
they’ll take their money elsewhere
unless it’s reformed. So it served as 
a constraint on the federal govern-
ment when the states had that
ability. More interestingly, it puts
state-level intergovernmental com-
petition to work in raising 
federal revenue. You can have the
same size government, federal and
state, as you do now with the other
mechanism. But it’s just that 
instead of the federal government 
collecting one-size-fits-all taxes
across all states — right now we have the same federal
income tax rate in all states and the same types of federal
taxes in all states — it may be that in West Virginia 
the revenue would be more efficiently raised by taxing 
natural resources. Or maybe the optimal tax rate 
here isn’t the same as in California. So it puts 
that intergovernmental competition to work in raising 
federal revenue. 
We found that during the Civil War, the Confederate
States of America experimented with a similar mechanism,
where they levied a property tax on the Confederate states
Russell S. Sobel
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national government. If the state submitted the revenue, then
they would not levy the tax in that state. And all but one state
opted to do that. The states were given the option to levy the
taxes in alternative ways to a property tax to raise that money,
and the Confederate government got all the money it wanted.
The nice thing about that structure is it overcomes the
free rider problem. People worry in contribution systems
about scenarios like — what if California doesn’t pay? Well,
the nice thing about the Confederate solution was that if the
state didn’t submit the money, then the national government
could go in and levy the taxes and collect them itself. In a
hybrid model that I proposed in a paper, the states could
elect to submit to the federal government the revenues that
would replace the federal income tax burden on West
Virginia. If we wanted, we could levy that as a sales tax and
do away with the federal income tax in West Virginia. That’s
one of the favorite issues I’ve worked on, but certainly rela-
tive to FEMA and state policy research that may have an
impact, I doubt this will have an impact.
RF: Many people believe that Wal-Mart causes signifi-
cant harm to the small, “mom and pop” business 
sector of the economy. Is that consistent with your 
empirical findings?
Sobel: This idea came up when I was directing the entre-
preneurship center here at WVU. People kept saying, “How
can we compete with the big-box stores like Wal-Mart?”
Certainly, we see in those communities where Wal-Mart
moves in, that stores go out of business. Wal-Mart beats
small businesses that are competing in direct lines of mer-
chandise. But here in Morgantown, some years after
Wal-Mart came, all those storefronts are filled today by new
and different things — by law offices, antique stores, and so
on. They fill those same storefronts that were once things
like general merchandisers, building suppliers, and hardware
stores. The creative destruction process has replaced those
things with new ones, and many of those new things aren’t
even retail. Yes, Wal-Mart creates failures. But with Wal-
Mart, we all save money so we can spend money on more
things. We have new small businesses pop up. The question
I was interested in was, when looking at aggregate measures
of small business in the economy today, has that sector been
influenced by the influx of Wal-Mart stores?
We looked across states at the relationship between 
Wal-Mart stores and the size of the small-business sector
along several different measures — sole proprietorships, firms
with one to four employees, and even firms with five to nine
employees. Through time we found that there was 
no effect in either direction relative to Wal-Mart. There are
just as many small businesses today in the United States as
there were when Wal-Mart was just one store in Arkansas.
Some states have a lot of Wal-Marts per capita and other 
states few, sometimes because state laws have kept them out.
But we don’t see a much-larger proportion of small businesses
in states that have kept Wal-Mart out. So the conclusion of
our research seems to be pretty clear: that today’s small-busi-
ness sector has not been, as a whole, handicapped by the
presence of Wal-Mart. In fact, it’s just created reallocations
within the small-business sector.
Now, people say, “Of course, there are still small businesses
but they’re worse,” that somehow they’re not as good. We
looked at average revenues and profits of small businesses and
can’t find an effect there either. So this is a case we came at
with the question of what did the data say, and interestingly
enough, the data say zero. This is a case where we just can’t
find an impact, either positive or negative, on the size of the
small-business sector. It doesn’t mean that Wal-Mart doesn’t
cause certain small businesses to fail. But if you’re someone in
the Small Business Administration promoting small-business
activity in the United States, our research clearly suggests that
Wal-Mart should be the least of your worries.
RF: Can you briefly explain how NASCAR drivers have
responded to safety improvements in their cars?
Sobel: In the economics literature, the root of all this is Sam
Peltzman’s argument in 1970 that safety improvements in
automobiles would lead to more reckless driving and 
therefore would have some secondary effects that would off-
set the positive effects from the safety features. It’s been
more than 30 years since that article was published and 
people have been looking for these effects. The problem is
that most of the data are state level and they are hard to use,
because, for example, we have snow in West Virginia that
causes more accidents. You can’t control for everything, and
you can’t control for compliance as to whether people are
wearing their seatbelts. So it’s a problem in looking at 
measures and trying to find the existence of the Peltzman
effect. The day I came up with the idea, I was teaching my
principles of economics class and was talking about the
famous example that is usually attributed to Gordon Tullock:
that a dagger placed in the middle of the steering wheel, 
eliminating the seat belt, would cause people to drive more
safely. I always wished I had the opposite. What do people do
when cars are really safe? And then it came out of my mouth:
When cars get so safe that you can flip them and roll them
over and walk away without a scratch, people drive them at
200 mph on a little round track inches away from each other.
What I wanted to do was go back and look at NASCAR.
Agraduate student of mine was a big NASCARfan. He col-
lected all the data. It’s an ideal environment to test this in
because there are so many things we can’t control for in the
real world that are already controlled for by NASCAR. For
example, they don’t race in the rain. You know they are all
complying and we can actually measure how reckless people
drive, how many wrecks there are or how many cautions, and
we can measure what the true odds of getting hurt are.
Going way back in NASCAR history the cars were not all
that safe. In the early road races there were guys in convert-
ibles with motorcycle helmets. So safety has been increasing
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injury is, what the odds are of getting injured or killed, for
every year. The simple question we look at is, as these cars
have become safer, given that drivers are much less likely to
get injured or killed today than 20 years ago, what effect has
that had on measures of reckless driving and accidents with-
in NASCAR? We find that, no matter how you measure it,
there have been increases in accidents as cars have become
safer in NASCAR. We even took a subsample of the five to
10 drivers who were there throughout the entire history and
just looked at their behavior and found that they got into
more accidents as their cars became safer.
Of course, the reason why is they want to win races and
you’ve got to take risky maneuvers to win races, to pass other
cars. We find very strong support for the Peltzman effect in
NASCAR. But if those effects are big enough, you could end
up with safety improvements causing more harm than good.
Luckily, we didn’t find that large of an effect. In fact, it seems
like a win-win. As you make the cars safer in NASCARwe do
end up with more accidents. Fans like to watch races, in part,
for the accidents, and we are getting more of them, but
fewer drivers are getting injured because the safety improve-
ments have been so large.
RF: By extension, can we assume that, on average,
today’s everyday motorists are also driving more reck-
lessly because they are behind the wheels of safer cars?
Sobel: It’s an interesting question. We certainly can demon-
strate it exists in NASCAR, but a NASCAR driver might be
different in a lot of ways from the average driver. They might
be more risk-loving than the average driver. But there are 
possible similarities. If you’re a NASCAR driver, you’re 
making a choice to take a maneuver that will save you time to
get you ahead, and the reason for doing that is to win the race.
Every day on my way to work, I’ve got a goal, which is to get to
work quickly. So when I’m on my way somewhere in the car,
I’ve got the same choices in terms of cutting in between cars
or running a yellow light. In a very fundamental sense, the
marginal decisionmaking is the same in those two instances.
RF: You’ve used walkie-talkies as a way to increase class-
room participation. How did you come up with that idea
and has it worked?
Sobel: When I got here and started teaching large lecture
classes, I wanted to find a way to increase class participation.
One day when a teaching assistant was giving the lecture, I sat
in the back of the class. Lo and behold, I could hear talking all
around me, and they were talking about economics and lean-
ing over and asking me questions. I realized that people in the
back of the room really do want to talk to me and ask ques-
tions. It’s much harder, though, when you’ve got to stand up
and yell out in front of 300 students to get those answers. So I
came up with the idea of using walkie-talkies. When I sug-
gested it to my department chair and my wife, they laughed at
me. I went to Radio Shack and got some cheap walkie-talkies
and passed them out in the class. Then I took one of them and
put it up as a podium microphone, so that anything said over
any one of the walkie-talkies comes out over the speaker 
system just as loud as my cordless microphone. I started
experimenting and passing them out and, sure enough, the
students loved them. The process evolved and pretty much
now in all my large lecture classes I give out walkie-talkies
every day. They have numbers and then I say, “OK, who’s got
walkie-talkie number 1,” and then talk to them for a minute
and learn their name and find out a bit about them. I call on
them for examples. The people with walkie-talkies, even on
days when they don’t take them, are now much more likely to
speak because they have stood up and spoken to me before.
The interesting part of it is getting to know my students and
making them feel like I care about their participation, and 
getting input on the class. I talk very fast so I let them use a
beep button to pause me. It’s not high-tech but it’s been very 
successful and helped me win some teaching awards. I used
the award money to buy new walkie-talkies.
RF: What are you working on now?
Sobel:  I was watching “Law and Order” with my wife 
and the episode was about the district attorney (DA) being
up for re-election. What happened is that someone con-
fessed to a crime, but as a viewer you’re thinking that they
didn’t really do it but they just got pressured into confessing
because they wanted the conviction before the DA’s 
re-election. So I started wondering if that really happens,
because that’s an issue of whether the political process of
elections plays a role in the outcomes of our legal system.
The innovation of our paper is that we were able to actually
find the timing of these DA elections. The question
remained: How do you measure false confessions or false
convictions? After a year of thinking about it, I found 
the ideal data set. There are several programs, such as the
Innocence Project, that look at questionable cases from 
the past and use DNA evidence to free people wrongly 
convicted. They have now freed 500 to 1,000 people scat-
tered throughout history based on overturning those
convictions with modern DNAevidence. What we’re doing
is going back and looking at all the cases overturned, looking
at the distribution of the timing of the original conviction —
for example, what month of the year and was it near an 
election. We have found that Octobers of election years
have more than four times as many convictions later over-
turned as any other month of any other year in the data.
The people from the Innocence Project say they don’t look
at timing at all, they just pick the cases based on merit. 
So you’d expect this to be a randomly scattered distribution
throughout months of the year looking at original dates of
conviction. What we’re finding is that there are some incen-
tives at play to get convictions around election time. 
The Duke Lacrosse case is relevant because that happened
right around that DA’s election.  RF
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